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Plausibility and probability in deductive reasoning
Andrew MacFie∗
Abstract
We consider the problem of rational uncertainty about unproven mathe-
matical statements, remarked on by Gödel and others. Using Bayesian-inspired
arguments we build a normative model of fair bets under deductive uncertainty
which draws from both probability and the theory of algorithms. We comment
on connections to Zeilberger’s notion of “semi-rigorous proofs”, particularly
that inherent subjectivity would be present. We also discuss a financial view
with models of arbitrage where traders have limited computational resources.
Contents
1 A natural problem: Quantified deductive uncertainty 2
1.1 The phenomenon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 The (modeling) problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Formal representation of plausibilities 4
2.1 Plausibility functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3 Epistemic quality vs. computation costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4 Conditional plausibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3 Rational plausibilities in mathematics 7
3.1 Scoring rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2 Foundations of “semi-rigorous proofs” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4 Arbitrage pricing in markets with computational constraints 10
5 Conclusion 11
∗School of Mathematics and Statistics, Carleton University. This work was done in part
while the author was a visitor at the Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and
Applied Sciences.
1
1 A natural problem: Quantified deductive
uncertainty
1.1 The phenomenon
Epistemic uncertainty is usually defined as uncertainty among physical states
due to lack of data or information. By information we mean facts which we
observe from the external world. For example, whether it rains tomorrow is
a piece of information we have not observed, so we are uncertain about its
truth value. However, we also may have uncertainty about purely deductive
statements, which are completely determined by the information we have, due
to limited reasoning ability. That is, before we have proved or refuted a math-
ematical statement, we have some deductive uncertainty about whether there
is a proof or refutation.
Under deductive uncertainty, there is a familiar process of appraising a degree
of belief one way or the other, saying a statement has high or low plausibility.
We may express rough confidence levels in notable open conjectures such as
P 6= NP [32] or the Goldbach conjecture, and we also deal with plausibility in
everyday mathematical reasoning. Sometimes general patterns show up across
problems and we extrapolate them to new ones. If we have an algorithm and
are told it runs in time O(n lgn), we usually assume that this implies good
practical performance because this is a commonly observed co-occurrence. So
the plausibility of the running time being 1010!n⌈lg n⌉ is considered particularly
low. Any mathematical result seen as “surprising” must have been a priori
implausible. Et cetera. Many more examples of plausibility in mathematics
may be found in [47, 41].
In some instances it may be natural to quantify deductive uncertainty, and
perhaps speak of “probabilities”. For example, let d be the 10100th decimal
digit of pi. If we have not computed d and all we know is that, say, d is odd,
it feels like d has a uniform probability distribution over {1, 3, 5, 7, 9}. Mazur
[41, Sec. 2] would describe this as an application of the principle of insufficient
reason. We use the same “symmetry” argument to state the probability that
a given number n is prime via the prime number theorem or Fermat primality
test. Probabilities also show up in enumerative induction, where confidence in
a universal quantification increases as individual instances are verified. The
four color theorem is one of many cases where only positive instances could
be found and eventually a proof was given. Furthermore, to this theorem and
other similar claims there are relevant 0-1 laws [7] which state that the “con-
ditional probability” of a uniform random instance being a counterexample,
given that counterexamples exist, goes to 1 asymptotically. With this fact one
can use individual instances to “update” a Bayesian probability on the uni-
versal statement. Bayesianism in practical mathematics has been discussed
previously in [12].
Notwithstanding the examples above, mathematicians generally leave their un-
certainty unquantified. This may be due to haziness about, for example, what
2
a “60% chance” means, and how probability should be used, in the context
of deductive reasoning. One point to emphasize is that we are referring to
subjective uncertainty rather than any due to inherent “randomness” of math-
ematics. Of course there is nothing random about whether a proof exists of
a given mathematical statement. Frege, speaking on mathematical reasoning,
appears to note this lack of randomness as a problem: “the ground [is] unfa-
vorable for induction; for here there is none of that uniformity which in other
fields can give the method a high degree of reliability” [21]. I.e. a set of propo-
sitions may be homogeneous in some ways but their truth values cannot be
seen as merely IID samples because the propositions are actually distinct and
distinguishable. However, if we model bounded reasoning we may indeed have
an analogy to other forms of uncertainty.
1.2 The (modeling) problem
Gödel mentions deductive probabilities in a discussion of empirical methods
in mathematics [28]:
It is easy to give examples of general propositions about integers
where the probability can be estimated even now. For example, the
probability of the proposition which states that for each n there
is at least one digit 6= 0 between the n-th and n2-th digits of the
decimal expansion of pi converges toward 1 as one goes on verifying
it for greater and greater n.
In commentary, Boolos naturally asks how such probabilities would be com-
puted [9]:
One may, however, be uncertain whether it makes sense to ask
what the probability is of that general statement, given that it has
not been falsified below n = 1000000, or to ask for which n the
probability would exceed .999.
With Boolos, we want to know, how would subjective deductive probabilities
work in general? Are there right and wrong ways to assign these probabilities?
Do they even make sense? These questions have both positive and normative
versions; we focus on the normative.
Bayesianism is the theory of probabilities for physical uncertainty [57]. It
gives an interpretation of probability, where we take a probability space, and
interpret the probability measure as assigning subjective degrees of belief to
events which represent expressible physical states. Looking from the reverse
direction, Bayesianism argues from the nature of physical uncertainty to reach
a conclusion that degrees of belief should form a probability space. In this
second sense we can think of Bayesianism as a proof, where the premise is
physical uncertainty, the inferences are rationality arguments, and the con-
clusion is probability theory. There are two ways to make use of a proof to
learn something new. First, we can apply the theorem if we are able to satisfy
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the premise. Here this would mean reducing deductive uncertainty to physi-
cal uncertainty by defining virtual information states. This general problem
of deductive probabilities has received some attention in the literature (the
sample space is taken to consist of complete formal theories) as we mention in
later sections. But what if there is no valid way to define virtual information
for deductive uncertainty, i.e. what if probability theory is not appropriate for
deductive uncertainty in this manner? What if something else is? The second
way to learn from a proof is to imitate the proof technique. Here we would
start with the premise of deductive uncertainty, proceed using analogous but
adapted rationality arguments, and reach a conclusion which is a set of math-
ematical rules possibly different from probability theory. We focus on this
approach.
The first step is to fix a concrete and unambiguous way to quantify uncertainty.
If we assign a number to our belief in a statement, what does that mean? And
is it always possible for us to do so? In Bayesianism, uncertainty is quantified
by a single real number from [0, 1] and a prominent operational definition of
this quantification is based on fair bets [51, Ch. 13] [57, Sec. 2.2.1]. This oper-
ationalization appears to work equally well for deductive uncertainty. That is,
anyone can express their uncertainty about a mathematical statement φ using
a number in [0, 1] which encodes the betting payoffs they consider acceptable
if they were to bet on φ. We call these values plausibilities. (This is not to be
confused with other usages such as “plausibility measures” [29, Sec. 2.8]). We
assume this operationalization is meaningful and understood.
In the context of physical uncertainty, Bayesianism adds constraints on what
plausibilities/probabilities should be for a rational agent, namely coherence (so
plausibilities are probabilities), conditionalization, regularity and other guid-
ance for selecting priors [57, 40]. Also, probabilistic forecasts may be rated on
accuracy using loss functions [38].
However, the assumptions of Bayesianism on which these constraints are based
do not necessarily still apply to deductive plausibilities and indeed we may
have additional or different requirements. Thus the precise question to an-
swer is, what constraints should be put on deductive plausibilities and what
mathematical structure results?
2 Formal representation of plausibilities
2.1 Plausibility functions
Fix an encoding of deductive statements into finite strings so that there is
a decision problem Π ⊆ {0, 1}∗ corresponding to the true statements. We
take an association of plausibilities to encoded statements as a function p :
{0, 1}∗ → [0, 1]. We call p a plausibility function. A plausibility function
represents an agent’s uncertainty about Π. One could also have defined a
plausibility function to take a finite sequence of input strings and return a
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finite sequence of plausibilities, that is, working at the level of bet systems
instead of bets.
2.2 Languages
Finding proofs is a matter of computation, so our reasoning abilities are equiva-
lent to our computational resources; and generally we will experience deductive
uncertainty when faced with any intractable computational problem. Impor-
tantly, we cannot meaningfully talk about problems with only one input, since
obviously the best output is the actual truth value. So we must talk of uncer-
tainty about an entire set of inputs simultaneously.
Probability spaces consist of a measurable space and a probability measure. In
Bayesianism, the measurable space may be substituted by a “sentence space”
which is closed under logical operations. In the deductive case, any nontrivial
problem Π has an input set that is trivially closed under logical operations,
since any input is logically equivalent to “true” or “false”. We conclude that
the problem Π need not a priori have any particular syntactic structure and
we may consider standard problems from theoretical computer science.
There is a line of research on deductive uncertainty where the inputs come
from a first-order language. Typically this work aims at finding composites of
logic and probability theory, and there is less focus on practicality. The most
recent work is by Garrabrant et al. [23] and [23, Sec. 1.2] reviews previous
literature. In the present work we instead restrict our attention to decidable
problems. We do this because inconsistent logics do not make sense in terms
of betting. So first-order logics are problematic due to Gödel’s first and second
incompleteness theorems.
2.3 Epistemic quality vs. computation costs
For a given problem Π ⊆ {0, 1}∗ we seek an epistemic improvement relation ≺Π
on plausibility functions, where q ≺Π p iff p is a strictly better uncertainty as-
signment for Π than q, ignoring any computational costs of the functions. For
example, if we decide to require regularity, we would say that for all functions
p and q, if p is regular and q is not then q ≺Π p. Guidance for selecting plausi-
bility functions is then based on weighing ≺Π against computational costs. If
we are given a probability distribution on inputs, we take the distributional de-
cision problem (Π,D) and consider a distribution-specific relation ≺(Π,D). We
refer to the relation as an order but it is not necessarily total.
Improvement relations can be found in other modeling contexts. For algo-
rithm running time sequences we use asymptotic relations such as big O or
polynomial growth vs. non-polynomial growth. Fine-grained relations may be
used if the model of computation is fixed. The Nash equilibrium represents a
kind of ordering which expresses that a strategy profile can be improved from
one player’s perspective. Pareto optimality is similar but for group rationality.
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Another example is the Marshall/Kaldor-Hicks social welfare improvement re-
lation in economics [19, 22]. This last relation is useful even though it cannot
be defined to be both transitive and antisymmetric.
In general we have a tradeoff between epistemic quality (whatever we deter-
mine that to be) and computational complexity. A theory of deductive uncer-
tainty must not only define gradients of epistemic quality but dictate how to
make this tradeoff. If we allow arbitrary computations, the problem immedi-
ately disappears. E.g. there is a temptation to look into Solomonoff induction
[40] as a model of inductive reasoning applied to mathematical knowledge.
This would be an attempt to formalize, e.g. Pólya’s patterns of plausible rea-
soning [47, 41], such as “A analogous to B, B more credible =⇒ A somewhat
more credible”. However we must be cautious, because an incomputable prior
cannot be the correct tradeoff between quality and efficiency.
Computation costs may or may not be measured asymptotically. Asymptotic
means no finite set of inputs can make a difference. If we use asymptotic com-
plexity this forces us to define ≺Π so that it is compatible, i.e. also asymptotic.
As an example, utility in game theory is generally not compatible with asymp-
totic computation costs. There are, however, game models which trade off
running time and other considerations in a non-trivial way, for example using
discounted utility. In economics and game theory, the concept of “bounded ra-
tionality” refers to decision making with limitations on reasoning/optimization
power, such as imperfect recall, time constraints, etc. [50]. We note some
economic models which incorporate bounded computation: game-playing Tur-
ing machines with bounded state set [42], automata models [45], machines
as strategies and utility affected by computation cost [30, 20], information as-
symetry in finance [1]. If a game model uses a practically awkward criterion for
algorithm performance, simple models of computation may be used, or equi-
libria may be reasoned about without analyzing a particular algorithm.
A simple approach to the tradeoff is to fix a resource bound and consider
as “feasible” only functions that can be computed within the bound. Then,
given ≺Π, we optimize over the subset of feasible plausibility functions. This
is the method we focus on in the remainder. E.g. we may assume the Cobham-
Edmonds thesis and consider ≺Π restricted to polynomial-time-computable
functions.
We make the assumption that we, as modelers, are always capable of ana-
lyzing given plausibility functions however is necessary to evaluate ≺Π and
analyze computational complexity. This is of course not true, as discussed
in [2, 43] which consider bounded rationality in economic systems. However
this is a worthy assumption since building meta-uncertainty into the model
creates a regress which would add significant complexity. Thus we can say
that optimizing ≺Π is the rational way to select a plausibility function even if
we are not currently able to do so constructively. Particularly, when we ana-
lyze functions according to an input distribution, the business of defining the
distribution is that of the unbounded analyst. In practice, e.g. approximation
algorithms are analyzed, even if the problem they attempt to approximate is
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intractable.
2.4 Conditional plausibility
If we select plausibility functions by optimizing ≺Π over feasible functions, the
definition of feasibility could change over time or simply vary across contexts,
so in general we speak of conditional plausibility functions p(·|S), where S is an
oracle or complexity class or other representation of the resources available to
compute the function. Another interpretation is that, over time, computation
costs may effectively come down, enlarging the budget set of feasible functions.
This notation and terminology indicate an analogy where knowledge, in the
computational sense (roughly that of [25, Sec. 9.2.3], [26, Sec. 7.2]), takes the
place of information.
In Bayesianism, conditionalization is the process by which updates on new
information must occur. I.e. after observing A, our new probability of B is
P (B|A) = P (A ∩ B)/P (A). We note that conditionalization is a uniform
process in that there is a finite rule that performs updates for all events A
at all times. If there is an infinite set of possible S, we could restrict to
uniform-updating plausibility functions, i.e. those which take a representation
of S as a parameter. In, for example, Garrabrant’s model [23], the plausibility
function takes an additional parameter n, which is the number of stages to
run. However this level of analysis is beyond our scope.
3 Rational plausibilities in mathematics
3.1 Scoring rules
As a method of eliciting quantified uncertainty, fair bet odds are equivalent
to asking “what is an objective chance p¯ such that your uncertainty of this
event is equivalent to that of an event with objective chance p¯?”. These are
also equivalent to strictly proper scoring rules, which go back to de Finetti and
beyond [15]. This refers to a situation where the agent is asked for a number
x ∈ [0, 1] representing uncertainty about a proposition φ, and then the agent
receives a score of B([φ], x). Here we use Iverson brackets where [φ] is 1 if φ is
true, and 0 otherwise. (The word “score” is a bit of a misnomer because lower
scores are better.) The scoring function B is strictly proper iff
argmin
x
yB(1, x) + (1− y)B(0, x) = y,
i.e. if we assumed [φ] is a Bernoulli(y)-distributed random variable, then we
obtain the optimal expected score by choosing x = E[φ] = y. We note that
with both betting and scoring, the agent is presented with a simple decision
where the only computational difficulty comes from the one instance of some
decision problem. This allows us to conclude that their equivalence holds in
the computational setting as well.
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Since plausibilities encode how we make simple decisions, more desirable plau-
sibility values are those that lead to better outcomes from decisions. Dutch
book arguments justifying Bayesianism are essentially saying if you can avoid
losing money in a bet, you should. On the other hand, scoring rules are gen-
erally considered to index epistemic quality. In fact, the concepts of betting
and scoring rules are essentially the same for classical uncertainty. It is shown
in [46] that Dutch books exist iff an agent’s forecasts are strictly dominated,
where domination means there is another plausibility assignment that obtains
a better score in all outcomes, according to a continuous proper scoring rule.
We take this scoring rule characterization of Bayesianism (which led to proba-
bility theory in that case) and apply it to deductive plausibilities via analysis
of plausibility functions.
Proper scoring rules conveniently associate a real number to each of our plau-
sibilities. The Brier score has some desirable properties [54]. The logarith-
mic score also has desirable properties and is closely related to information-
theoretic entropy. Given any proper scoring rule, one can always construct a
decision environment such that performance in the environment is precisely
performance according to the scoring rule. However, scoring rules are equiv-
alent in the context of conditional expectation [4] and by analogy we may
expect rational plausibilities to approximately share this property and others
[39, 48].
Worst-case scoring of plausibility functions leads to trivialities since p ≡ 1/2
is optimal unless the problem can be exactly solved. An alternative in some
cases would be to consider inputs of length ≤ n rather than n, but we focus
on the standard practice of considering inputs of the same length. In the
context of professional mathematics, we may take an average-case approach
with a fixed input distribution. This is a non-adversarial model where the
distribution reflects inputs that come up in practice and the agent is betting
“against nature”.
If inputs are distributed according to an ensemble D, we may say that q ≺(Π,D) p
if the expected score of p is less than that of q. The comparison may be
asymptotic. This is the model used in [37] which develops some relevant math-
ematical theory. More general background includes average-case complexity
theory [33, 8] and probabilistic numerics [49, 11]. (A very similar view is con-
sidering p as an unnormalized distribution on strings of length n, and finding
the statistical distance between the normalized distribution and the normal-
ized distribution corresponding to 1Π. There we would require at least that
E(p) = E(1Π).)
3.2 Foundations of “semi-rigorous proofs”
Zeilberger presented the concept of a “semi-rigorous proof” and predicted that
it might become acceptable by the mathematical community: “I can envision
an abstract of a paper, c. 2100, that reads: ‘We show, in a certain precise sense,
that the Goldbach conjecture is true with probability larger than 0.99999’”
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[58]. In order for such a result to be useful, perhaps there must be cases where
plausibilities are objective.
According to ≺(Π,D), are plausibilities objective or subjective? Should we ex-
pect people to agree on plausibilities? There are various sources of subjectivity:
how to embed individual questions in problems, first-order logic issues, and
problems Π where ≺(Π,D) has no unique optimum. For example, take Gödel’s
pi problem from Sec. 1.2: Let φ represent the sentence, for each n there is at
least one digit 6= 0 between the n-th and n2-th digits of the decimal expansion
of pi. To condition on observed digits of pi, we can allow access to an oracle
that checks φ for large ranges of the digits of pi. First, there may not be a
proof or refutation of φ, in which case betting outcomes are undefined. Sec-
ond, if φ is decideable, its truth value can always be hard coded in p even if
we embed φ in a class of problem instances which is standard and universal.
Analyzing general methods of computing plausibilities, rather than individual
values, does makes sense since people typically use heuristics in a consistent
manner across problems.
In traditional Bayesianism there is a seemingly ineradicable source of subjectiv-
ity from the choice of prefix Turing machine used to define Solomonoff’s prior.
Any one string can be assigned (almost) an arbitrary probability. Perhaps we
are left with an analogous but different kind of subjectivity for mathematical
plausibilities.
We stated at the end of Sec. 1.1 that mathematicians may be uncomfortable
with putting too much focus on plausibilities. Gödel says, “I admit that every
mathematician has an inborn abhorrence to giving more than heuristic signif-
icance to such inductive arguments” [28]. Also, Corfield notes, “Pólya himself
had the intuition that two mathematicians with apparently similar expertise
in a field might have different degrees of belief in the truth of a result and treat
evidence for that result differently” [12]. However, the physics community has
had notable success using non-rigorous mathematical methods.
One practical issue with publishing probabilities for mathematical problems is
error amplification. If we take the conjunction of two “independent” uncertain
statements we end up with uncertainty greater than that of either of the orig-
inal statements, which means confidence erodes over time. In mathematics
this is undesirable since we are used to taking arbitrarily long sequences of
conjunctions and implications with no loss of validity.
More on probabilistic proofs is found in [18]. The potential for models of
uncertainty in mathematics to explain the use of large computations to increase
confidence in conjectures is noted in [12].
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4 Arbitrage pricing in markets with computa-
tional constraints
Here we use the language of finance; see the paper [44] for some discussion on
the equivalence of Dutch books and arbitrage. Suppose instead of a binary
function 1Π we estimate a continuous-valued function F . Consider a 2-period
market where at time t = 0 the seller(s) offer a price f(x) for each asset
x ∈ {0, 1}∗. Also at time t = 0, a buyer buys a quantity g(x) of the asset
x at the prices given by f , where g(x) < 0 indicates short selling. At time
t = 1, each asset x has terminal payoff determined by F (x). Ignoring time
discounting, the buyer’s gain from x is
F (x)g(x)− f(x)g(x).
The function F may be of two possible kinds. If the payoffs are determinis-
tic, then computation of F is presumably non-trivial but ultimately must be
performed. On the other hand, the payoffs represented by F may be expected
values of some random variables, in which case there is no need for F to be
computationally tractable, but sampling from the relevant probability distri-
butions should be. Roughly speaking, these situations we describe could be
found where information is fixed throughout the market history t = 0, 1 and
F is a reference model used to price the assets X, and where F has nontrivial
computational complexity. In the more general and likely more realistic case
where information is not fixed, there would be a tradeoff between waiting for
more information and performing lengthier computations which is not included
in this model.
Computational aspects of economic price models such as Arrow-Debreu equilib-
ria [55] and combinatorial auctions [13] have received interest in the literature
[17, 35, 3]. Pricing is often based on probabilistic models. Computational
difficulty leads to the use of Monte Carlo methods e.g. for numerical solutions
to stochastic differential equations, Bayesian posteriors, and other simulations
[53, 24, 52]. Probabilistic inference in Bayesian networks is known to be com-
putationally hard in general [14]. The hardness of pricing arbitrary exotic
derivatives is explored in [10].
What does arbitrage mean in this context? Suppose Cg is a class of functions
g. Then we would say the prices f admit arbitrage from Cg based on the
buyer’s gain
bn(g) =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
F (x)g(x)− f(x)g(x)
for different g ∈ Cg. In addition to computational constraints, we may restrict
Cg to polynomial growth and polynomial-sized support to reflect practical
trading limits. We could also allow the arbitrageur to randomly generate an
asset x, subject to computational constraints, so bn would be an expected
value. The classical definition of arbitrage [16] suggests requiring there exist
g ∈ Cg such that bn(g) ≥ 0 for all n and bn(g) > 0 infinitely often. We say a
sequence an is negligible iff an = n
−o(1). A relaxation of strict arbitrage would
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require having bn(g) positive and non-negligible infinitely often and not having
−bn(g) positive and non-negligible infinitely often.
In current complexity theory, it is not clear whether this form of arbitrage can
or cannot be avoided. The paper [27] shows that for the SAT problem, if f
is computable in polynomial time and Cg is the set of functions computed in
polynomial time, then we can always get bn > K infinitely often for some fixed
K > 0 unless P = NP.
5 Conclusion
Even within traditional Bayesianism, the assumption of computational un-
boundedness can be undesirable; this is known as the problem of logical omni-
science [34, 56, 31]. Some work has been done on formal models for logical non-
omniscience, including a resource-bounded AIXI [36] and resource-bounded
Solomonoff prior [40], although these are somewhat ad-hoc. As mentioned in
the previous section, in general an agent must make decisions based on the
available information and the computational costs of reasoning. A complete
decision theory with computational costs is the larger goal in this context,
which would generalize the current work, classical Bayesianism, and perhaps
more. Additionally, even if we have a definition of the optimal decision rule,
there may be research remaining in algorithm design and analysis to actually
construct it. And that research in turn may utilize a Bayesian perspective as
in the pseudo-distributions of the sum-of-squares algorithm [5, 6].
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